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Learning through Experience: Borrowing 
Lessons from Abroad to Understand the Legality 
of Unpaid Internships in America 
William Soule† 
ABSTRACT 
Unpaid internships in the United States often result in social waste by employing 
workers with valuable skills in positions that fail to efficiently use those skills. Be-
cause information asymmetry exists between the employer and the intern, interns 
are at a disadvantage in determining whether an employer will actually compen-
sate the intern with the opportunity to engage in future, valuable work. Current 
U.S. law on the issue remains a confusing mess of precedent and administrative 
law that differs from circuit to circuit. United Kingdom (U.K.) law provides a better 
solution by resting internship classification on mutuality of obligation combined 
with the presence of implied employment contracts. As a result, the United States 
should embrace the judicial ideas of courts in the United Kingdom, and Congress 
should pass legislation that creates a new employment classification for interns. In 
tandem, these two solutions should lessen the information asymmetry between em-
ployers and potential interns while incentivizing companies to hire interns by 
providing clear, stable rules. 
INTRODUCTION 
Unpaid internships are not a foreign subject to the legal commu-
nity. Many young law students receive their first legal experience work-
ing as a volunteer for a government agency or a non-profit organization 
during their first summer in law school. In its simplest form, these in-
ternships function as an opportunity for young students to wrestle with 
nuanced legal issues and contribute to the public good. In fact, the De-
partment of Labor specifically exempts government and non-profit or-
ganizations from wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act1 if 
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 1 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
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the interns understand that their role is purely voluntary.2 For govern-
ment agencies and non-profit organizations, the current law on unpaid 
internships seems to be adequate and uncontroversial.3 
However, it has become apparent to many that the legality of un-
paid internships outside of government agencies and non-profit organi-
zations remains an open question. The Supreme Court discussed a sim-
ilar issue in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,4 but that ruling came 
seventy years ago. Since then, numerous authorities have suggested 
criteria to determine what constitutes a valid unpaid internship.5 In an 
attempt to provide guidance to employers, the Department of Labor de-
veloped six criteria, which were drawn from the Portland Terminal de-
cision in 2010.6 However, five years after issuing the guidance, both the 
Second Circuit7 and the Eleventh Circuit8 flatly rejected the Depart-
ment of Labor’s six criteria. Instead, both courts embraced a “non-ex-
haustive set of considerations” including seven factors, not all of which 
need to point in the same direction or be weighted equally.9 As a result, 
not only is the law unclear on a national basis, but attempts to provide 
clarity by the Second Circuit and Eleventh Circuit are equally confusing 
and unwieldy. 
The confusion surrounding the legality of unpaid interns is partic-
ularly problematic given the prevalence of unsatisfactory internship ex-
periences. While unpaid internships are not a particularly recent phe-
nomenon, the Great Recession drew attention to the plight of unpaid 
interns.10 As countless students attempted to bolster their résumés with 
experience, an opportunity for experiential learning devolved into the 
performance of menial tasks for no compensation. One animation stu-
dent from New York University received an internship at Little Air-
plane, a children’s film company in Manhattan.11 Instead of working on 
 
 2 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS 
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Apr. 2010), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/ 
whdfs71.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNC7-DTSA]. 
 3 But see Thomas Johnson, Comment, The Fox Searchlight Signal: Why Fox Searchlight 
Marks the Beginning of the End for Preferential Treatment of Unpaid Internships at Nonprofits, 
102 VA. L. REV. 1127 (2016). 
 4 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
 5 See, e.g., Michael Pardoe, Comment, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.: Moving To-
wards a More Flexible Approach to the Classification of Unpaid Interns under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 75 MD. L. REV. 1159 (2016). 
 6 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., supra note 2. 
 7 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 8 Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 9 Glatt, 811 F.3d at 384. 
 10 See Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03intern.html [https://perma.cc/6FXJ-MFBT]. 
 11 Id. 
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projects related to her education, the student was “assigned to the fa-
cilities department and ordered to wipe the door handles each day to 
minimize the spread of swine flu.”12 Many stories of unpaid internships 
read similarly. Some stories, unfortunately, are far more tragic. For in-
stance, Kyle Grant, an unpaid intern at Warner Music Group who lived 
in a homeless shelter for the duration of this eight-month internship, 
garnered national attention in 2014.13 Similarly, twenty-two-year-old 
David Hyde spent two weeks living in a tent while working as an unpaid 
intern for the United Nations.14 Every morning, David would put on his 
suit and pack his home into his backpack before heading to work, but 
David’s story differs from Kyle Grant’s story slightly: David is a New 
Zealander working for the United Nations at its headquarters in Ge-
neva, Switzerland.15 Even the massive expanse of employment law 
promulgated by the European Union failed to fix a broken internship 
system. In struggling with the legality of unpaid internships, the 
United States is in good company. 
Other nations in the European Union and throughout the G20 eco-
nomic powers have crafted solutions to this persistent issue. Most of the 
solutions have fallen into two broad categories: a ban on all unpaid work 
unless associated with a short-term university program16 or the intro-
duction of judicially created factors that distinguish employee and non-
employee classifications.17 Unfortunately, neither solution adequately 
addresses the problem. On one hand, the first category eliminates un-
paid internship opportunities that can be beneficial to interns and busi-
nesses. For example, if a law professor wanted to spend five hours a 
week working at a French restaurant for no pay, gaining valuable skills 
and insight into French cuisine, it would be economically inefficient to 
disallow that arrangement. If the owner of the restaurant had to cate-
 
 12 Id. 
 13 Zach Schonfeld, Formerly Homeless Unpaid Intern Leading a Lawsuit against Warner Mu-
sic, NEWSWEEK (July 16, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/01/unpaid-internships-warner 
-music-group-warner-interns-lawsuits-257025.html [https://perma.cc/LSY3-4H77]. 
 14 Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, Unpaid UN Intern David Hyde Forced to Live in a Tent in 
Geneva, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/unpaid-
united-nations-intern-david-hyde-forced-to-live-in-a-tent-in-geneva-10451775.html [https://perm 
a.cc/Y3J9-HEST]. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See Marc Spielberger & Angela Schilling, Minimum Wages in Germany—You Might Be Af-
fected, Too: An Overview of the New German Minimum Wage Act (Mindestlohngesetz, MiLoG), 65 
LAB. L. J. 163 (2014) (describing the German approach to compensation for interns). 
 17 See, e.g., Dave J.G. McKechnie & Stefanie Di Francesco, “Intern(al) Affairs”: Managing Un-
paid Internships in Ontario, MCMILLAN (June 2015), http://www.mcmillan.ca/Managing-Unpaid-
Internships-in-Ontario [https://perma.cc/U7LM-834U] (describing the Canadian system of classi-
fying interns for purposes of compensation). 
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gorize the law professor as an employee, it seems unlikely that the ar-
rangement would exist, leaving both sides worse off.18 On the other 
hand, any employment decision based on a list of non-exhaustive, un-
weighted factors will lack clarity and lead to substantial confusion. Alt-
hough lessons about unpaid internship law can be learned from other 
legal regimes, most nations throughout the world are no better off than 
the United States. 
This Comment examines a possible modification to current law 
based on the experience of one nation that shares much in common with 
the United States: the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom shares 
similarities with the United States that extend beyond language. Both 
nations share a legal tradition and similar levels of economic develop-
ment and composition. However, each nation has a slightly different 
approach to the legality of unpaid internships.19 The current system in 
the United States occupies a middle ground between hard categoriza-
tions and extensive, numerous factor tests. In contrast, the United 
Kingdom has added an additional employment category of “worker” to 
potentially encompass interns. Comparing these two different ap-
proaches focuses the Comment on an intense debate between the effi-
cacy of rules and standards. 
After analyzing U.K. law, this Comment suggests that the United 
States should take two steps to creating better law surrounding intern-
ships. First, the United States should move to a system that adds a new 
employment category of “intern” that incorporates some, but not all, of 
the employment protections afforded to employees, as seen in the 
United Kingdom. For instance, the United Kingdom provides minimum 
wage protection for some labor participants but does not protect them 
from certain types of employment dismissal. The United States could 
define “interns” as a separate employment category with the desired 
protections. Second, American judges should focus on mutuality of obli-
gation like their U.K. counterparts. Specifically, instead of the numer-
ous common law tests that have developed, American courts should fo-
cus solely on whether the employer and intern share mutuality of 
obligation. Focusing on mutuality of obligation will correctly sort so-
cially useful and socially wasteful unpaid internships based on the core 
of the distinction: information asymmetry. 
 
 18 See, e.g., The Law School’s Top Chef, U. CHICAGO L. SCH. http://www.law.uchicago.edu/ 
node/2653 [https://perma.cc/FZY9-CRXA]. 
 19 See David Ellis, Unpaid Internships: Work for Pay, Never Pay for Work, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 
20, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/universityeducation/student-life/10709334/Unpa 
id-internships-work-for-pay-never-pay-for-work.html [https://perma.cc/KS4M-ZPGD] (explaining 
attempts to reform intern classification in Great Britain). 
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This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I contains an analysis 
of the current law surrounding unpaid internships in the United States. 
After considering the seeds of confusion sown by the vague definition of 
“employee” within the Fair Labor Standards Act, Part I will focus on 
the resulting case law that persists to the current moment. Part II will 
examine employment law in the United Kingdom, beginning with its 
fourth employment category, which attempts to fill in the cracks caused 
by using rigid employment categories in fluid definitions of employ-
ment. In this Part, common law tests from U.K. courts will be used to 
create clearer lines between employment categories in the United 
States. In addition, Part II will consider the process of adding another 
employment category and the United Kingdom’s continued struggle 
with eliminating abusive unpaid internships. Part III will examine the 
efficacy of the laws and judicial reasoning employed by U.K. courts to 
determine if the United States should pursue similar reforms. Addition-
ally, Part III will discuss how small elements of common law precedent 
can be incorporated into legal debates about the validity of unpaid in-
ternships. Finally, Part III will propose a dual solution to curbing abu-
sive unpaid internships. First, Congress should adopt a new employ-
ment classification specifically for interns that provides civil rights 
protection but not minimum wage protection. Second, courts in the 
United States should employ the logic of U.K. courts by holding mutu-
ality of obligation to be determinative in classification conflicts. 
I. THE FLSA AND UNPAID INTERNSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The confusion regarding the legality of unpaid internships centers 
on the Fair Labor Standards Act20 (FLSA) and its definition of “em-
ployee.” Under the FLSA, every employee is entitled to a minimum 
wage, and every employer is required to provide at least that amount to 
all employees.21 However, there is considerable dispute as to who should 
be considered an employee. An “employee” is defined by the FLSA as 
“any individual employed by an employer.”22 Under the FLSA, the def-
inition of “employ” is so broad that it merely “includes to suffer or per-
mit work.”23 Within these broad confines are several statutory excep-
tions. First, the law does not apply to immediate family members 
working on a family farm.24 Second, the law exempts “any individual 
 
 20 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 21 Id. § 206. 
 22 Id. § 203. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
29 SOULE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/17  9:06 PM 
772  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
who volunteers to perform services for a public agency which is a State, 
a political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency,” 
so long as the individual receives “no compensation or is paid expenses, 
reasonable benefits, or a nominal fee to perform the services for which 
the individual volunteered.”25 Finally, the term “employee” does not ap-
ply to those who “volunteer their services solely for humanitarian pur-
poses to private non-profit food banks.”26 With only three statutory ex-
ceptions, a significant amount of weight rests on what it means to 
“suffer or permit work.”27 
A. Portland Terminal and the Meaning of “Employ” 
In 1947, the Supreme Court spoke for the first and last time on the 
subject of “trainees” and crafted a decision filled with unanswered ques-
tions. In Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,28 the Court considered 
whether workers who had been trained as prospective brakemen for a 
railroad constituted employees under the FLSA. For the Court, this is-
sue was certainly a case of first impression that forced a difficult deci-
sion largely based on factual circumstance. Although lengthy, the reci-
tation of the facts provided by the Court is important to understanding 
later arguments made by the Department of Labor regarding what con-
stitutes a valid internship: 
For many years the . . . railroad has given a course of practical 
training to prospective yard brakemen. This training is a neces-
sary requisite to entrusting them with the important work 
brakemen must do. An applicant for such jobs is never accepted 
until he has had this preliminary training, the average length of 
which is seven or eight days. If accepted for the training course, 
an applicant is turned over to a yard crew for instruction. Under 
this supervision, he first learns the routine activities by obser-
vation, and is then gradually permitted to do actual work under 
close scrutiny. His activities do not displace any of the regular 
employees, who do most of the work themselves, and must stand 
immediately by to supervise whatever the trainees do. The ap-
plicant’s work does not expedite the company business, but may, 
and sometimes does, actually impede and retard it. If these 
trainees complete their course of instruction satisfactorily and 
are certified as competent, their names are included in a list 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
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from which the company can draw when their services are 
needed. Unless they complete the training and are certified as 
competent, they are not placed on the list. Those who are certi-
fied and not immediately put to work constitute a pool of quali-
fied workmen available to the railroad when needed.29 
While it may be easy to dismiss this recitation as unrelated to the defi-
nition of “employee,” this understanding of important factual aspects of 
the employer-employee relationship is the basis for the current disa-
greement in the law. 
In addition to the Court’s factual evaluation of what constitutes an 
“employee” in Portland Terminal, the Court also elucidates the confines 
of “employ” under the FLSA. First, the Court defines “employee” based 
on a common sense reading of congressional intent. For instance, the 
Court states that “suffer or permit to work” cannot be construed so 
broadly as to include “employees who, without any express or implied 
compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the 
premises of another.”30 If this were the case, the Court notes, then stu-
dents would be employees of the school they attended. The Court also 
expresses concern for a situation in which a “person who, without prom-
ise or expectation of compensation, but solely for his personal purpose 
or pleasure, worked in activities carried on by other persons either for 
their pleasure or profit.”31 Second, the Court maintains that the defini-
tion of “employ” is broad enough to guarantee fair compensation but no 
broader. According to the Court, the purpose of the FLSA “as to wages 
was to insure that every person whose employment contemplated com-
pensation should not be compelled to sell his services for less than the 
prescribed minimum wage.”32 However, the Court also states that “em-
ploy” cannot be construed “so as to make a person whose work serves 
only his own interest an employee of another person who gives him aid 
and instruction.”33 Unfortunately, neither of these arguments regard-
ing the definition of “employ” substantially clarified the confusion first 
brought before the court. 
Finally, the Court in Portland Terminal suggests that a determi-
nation of “immediate advantage” could be necessary to divine who 
should be considered an employee under the FLSA.34 Although the 
 
 29 Id. at 149–50. 
 30 Id. at 152. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 152. 
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Court only discusses “immediate advantage” in one sentence of the 
opinion, the Court appears to rest its decision on this concept. The Court 
states that “[a]ccepting the unchallenged findings here that the rail-
roads receive no ‘immediate advantage’ from any work done by the 
trainees, we hold that they are not employees within the [FLSA’s] 
meaning.”35 Nevertheless, the Court itself notes that abuse may arise 
from such a determination, but disregards any discussion on the topic 
until such a case arises.36 Of course, no such case has come before the 
Court in the past seventy years, despite cases that seem to entail the 
evasion the Court described.37 Perhaps the strangest part about the 
Court’s unwillingness to speak on what might be a legitimate evasion 
of the FLSA is that Portland Terminal, in essence, is about potential 
evasion of the FLSA. Regardless of the circuity of the Court’s logic, its 
inability to speak on the topic has generated a significant portion of the 
confusion that plagues the legality of unpaid internships to this day. 
B. The Department of Labor Fact Sheet #71 
In April 2010, the Department of Labor issued Fact Sheet #7138 to 
address confusion among employers surrounding the legality of unpaid 
internships. Noting that “employ” is used broadly in the FLSA, the fact 
sheet states that internships in the private sector besides those for non-
profit organizations will “most often be viewed as employment.”39 Fact 
Sheet #71 also places a fair amount of weight on the educational aspect 
of the internship. For instance, the Fact Sheet states that “[t]he more 
the internship provides the individual with skills that can be used in 
multiple employment settings, as opposed to skills particular to one em-
ployer’s operation, the more likely the intern would be viewed as receiv-
ing training.”40 Although this emphasis differs from the facts present in 
Portland Terminal, the rest of Fact Sheet #71 adheres closely to the 
Court’s main arguments. In addition to an emphasis on education, Fact 
Sheet #71 also emphasizes the importance of supervision from other 
employees and the opportunity to work in full-time employment imme-
diately following the internship.41 
 
 35 Id. at 153. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See, e.g., Cody Brookhouser, Comment, Whaling on Walling: A Uniform Approach to Deter-
mining Whether Interns Are “Employees” under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 100 IA. L. REV. 751, 
756 (2015). 
 38 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., supra note 2. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
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Fact Sheet #71 has caused disagreement among courts by extract-
ing a six-factor test from the observations of Portland Terminal. While 
Portland Terminal did not create a specific test, Fact Sheet #71 bor-
rowed the Court’s observations in light of the facts and attempted to 
distill these observations into concrete principles. Such a distillation is 
problematic given the Court’s largely fact-based decision in Portland 
Terminal. According to Fact Sheet #71, if all of the following six factors 
are met, then an intern is not an “employee” under the FLSA: 
1. The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the 
facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be 
given in an educational environment; 
2. The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; 
3. The intern does not displace regular employees, but works un-
der close supervision of existing staff; 
4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate 
advantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its 
operations may actually be impeded; 
5. The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion 
of the internship; and 
6. The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not 
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.42 
All six factors must be present according to Fact Sheet #71; thus, the 
exception to the FLSA is narrow. Fact Sheet #71 notes that the exclu-
sion is narrow “because the FLSA’s definition of ‘employ’ is very 
broad.”43 Indeed, considering all six factors above reveals a fairly lim-
ited set of situations that fit neatly into the created exclusion. While 
this rigid approach to classification may have introduced clarity into 
the discussion, it certainly introduced disagreement over the applica-
tion of the proposed factors. 
Circuit courts are divided over adopting Fact Sheet #71 and the six-
factor test it introduced. For instance, the Fifth Circuit has given a ver-
sion of the six-factor test originally used for trainees “substantial defer-
ence”—and it seems likely that this deference would extend to a similar 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
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test for internships, all things being constant.44 Both the Fourth Cir-
cuit45 and the Sixth Circuit46 have also determined that the test de-
serves deference. On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has treated the 
factors as relevant to a discussion of the definition of “employee” under 
the FLSA but not determinative.47 Going further, the Eleventh and Se-
cond Circuits have flatly rejected deference to Fact Sheet #71, with the 
Eleventh Circuit stating, “with all due respect to the Department of La-
bor, it has no more expertise in construing a Supreme Court case than 
does the Judiciary.”48 
In addition to questions of deference, circuit courts are also divided 
over whether the six-factor test in Fact Sheet #71 is consistent with 
Portland Terminal and, if inconsistent, what to use in its place. There 
are four broad groups that encompass the different opinions of those 
circuits that have considered the issue. First, only the Fifth Circuit ac-
cepts that test as consistent with Portland Terminal.49 Second, the 
Fourth Circuit50 and the Sixth Circuit51 have eschewed the six-factor 
test in favor of an analysis commonly known as the “primary benefi-
ciary” test.52 Third, the Eighth Circuit53 and the Tenth Circuit54 have 
embraced the “economic reality” test, which examines employment re-
lationships on a broad spectrum “with the ultimate criterion being the 
economic reality of the relationship.”55 Finally, the Second Circuit56 and 
the Eleventh Circuit57 have created a hybrid of the “primary benefi-
ciary” test mixed with elements of the “economic reality” test, where the 
“primary beneficiary” test may serve as an initial sorting device. How-
ever, both the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit are the only cir-
cuits that have directly discussed the applicability of Fact Sheet #71 
 
 44 See, e.g., Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 45 McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1211 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 46 Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 47 See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Prof. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 48 Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 49 See, e.g., Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 50 McLaughlin, 877 F.2d at 1209–10 (“[T]he proper legal inquiry in this case is whether . . . 
the new workers principally benefitted from the weeklong orientation agreement.”). 
 51 Solis, 642 F.3d at 525–26 (“[T]he district court focused on which party receives the primary 
benefit of the work performed by [the] students. This was the appropriate inquiry to make.”). 
 52 See Paul Budd, All Work and No Pay: Establishing the Standard for When Legal, Unpaid 
Internships Become Illegal, Unpaid Labor, 63 KAN. L. REV. 451 (2015). 
 53 Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 54 Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1557–58 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 55 Id. at 1558. 
 56 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 57 Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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and Portland Terminal to unpaid internships. While the other circuits 
were still considering the definition of “employee” under the FLSA, they 
were not directly addressing the legality of unpaid internships. This 
tension between direct confrontation of unpaid internships and a gen-
eral definition of “employee” under the FLSA established the im-
portance of the opinions issued recently by the Second Circuit and the 
Eleventh Circuit. 
C. Glatt, Schumann, and the Direct Assessment of Unpaid Interns 
under the FLSA 
In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.,58 the Second Circuit 
maintained that the use of the six-factor test laid out in Fact Sheet #71 
was inadequate to determine the status of unpaid interns under the 
FLSA. Instead, the court stated, “the proper question is whether the 
intern or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship.”59 
According to the court, there are three particular reasons why the pri-
mary beneficiary test is the correct starting point for analysis. First, the 
primary beneficiary test centers on what the intern receives in ex-
change for his work.60 Second, the test provides courts with greater flex-
ibility than a six-factor test.61 Third, the test pushes the analysis of the 
employer-intern relationship away from standard notions of the em-
ployer-employee relationship, which is necessary because “the intern 
enters into the relationship with the expectation of receiving educa-
tional or vocational benefits that are not necessarily expected with all 
forms of employment.”62 In determining what qualifies under the pri-
mary beneficiary test, the court also provided “a non-exhaustive set of 
considerations,” including: 
1. The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly un-
derstand that there is no expectation of compensation. Any 
promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the 
intern is an employee—and vice versa. 
2. The extent to which the internship provides training that 
would be similar to that which would be given in an educational 
 
 58 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 59 Id. at 536. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
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environment, including the clinical and other hands-on training 
provided by educational institutions. 
3. The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s for-
mal education program by integrated coursework or the receipt 
of academic credit. 
4. The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s 
academic commitments by corresponding to the academic calen-
dar. 
5. The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to the 
period in which the internship provides the intern with benefi-
cial learning. 
6. The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather 
than displaces, the work of paid employees while providing sig-
nificant educational benefits to the intern. 
7. The extent to which the intern and the employer understand 
that the internship is conducted without entitlement to a paid 
job at the conclusion of the internship.63 
Unlike Fact Sheet #71, the absence of one or more of these factors is not 
necessarily determinative. The Glatt approach allows weighing the to-
tality of these circumstances to determine whether a worker is an in-
tern or an employee. The court also emphasized that this approach “re-
flects a central feature of the modern internship—the relationship 
between the internship and the intern’s formal education—and is con-
fined to internships and does not apply to training programs in other 
contexts.”64 
Following in the footsteps of Glatt, the Eleventh Circuit in Schu-
mann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A.65 embraced the primary beneficiary 
test along with the non-exhaustive list of considerations provided by the 
Second Circuit. In the discussion of Portland Terminal and Fact Sheet 
#71, the court notes how impractical it seems to compare the modern 
internship experience with factors laid forth almost seventy years ago.66 
However, the court also states that only considering the primary bene-
ficiary test to determine the legality of unpaid internships is insuffi-
 
 63 Id. at 536–37. 
 64 Id. at 537. 
 65 803 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 66 Id. at 1210–11. 
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cient. For instance, the court states that a “dilemma arises in determin-
ing how to discern the primary beneficiary in a relationship where both 
the intern and the employer may obtain significant benefits.”67 The 
court states that the best way to evaluate this tension is “to focus on the 
benefits to the student while still considering whether the manner in 
which the employer implements the internship program takes unfair 
advantage of or is otherwise abusive towards the student.”68 This lan-
guage suggests that the court in Schumann sees the primary benefi-
ciary test as a threshold evaluation instead of a final determinative fac-
tor. 
While Glatt provided the barebones structure necessary to evaluate 
interns instead of trainees, Schumann imposes a measure of clarity and 
rationale on why the criteria proposed in Glatt is so effective.69 The 
court points to the fourth, fifth, and sixth factors as those that most 
properly consider the problems facing modern internships.70 However, 
the court in Schumann cautions that, unlike Fact Sheet #71’s hard-
edged, six-factor test, there may be instances where the primary bene-
ficiary test in Glatt will fall short of a clear answer. The court states: 
We can envision a scenario where a portion of the student’s ef-
forts constitute a bona fide internship that primarily benefits 
the student, but the employer also takes unfair advantage of the 
student’s need to complete the internship by making continua-
tion of the internship implicitly or explicitly contingent on the 
student’s performance of tasks or his working of hours well be-
yond the bounds of what could fairly be expected to be a part of 
the internship.71 
It is difficult not to interpret the court’s statement above as an admis-
sion that there will likely never be a perfect bright line rule regarding 
what constitutes illegitimate unpaid internships under the FLSA. In-
deed, with four different stances between seven different circuits, bar-
ring legislative action by Congress or an opinion from the Supreme 
Court, clarity within the law seems out of reach when only considering 
the precedent laid forth by the courts of the United States. 
 
 67 Id. at 1211. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 1213. 
 70 Id. at 1213–14. 
 71 Id. at 1214–15 (emphasis in original). 
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D. Information Asymmetry and “Abusive” Unpaid Internships 
Before considering a new framework to address unpaid intern-
ships, it is necessary to specifically divide a socially useful unpaid in-
ternship from an “abusive” unpaid internship. In order to actually un-
derstand how a solution to a problem might work, some sort of 
differentiation is required beyond a “know-it-when-we-see-it” test. The 
two extremes of the issue seem clear. On one side, an internship that 
allows a young student to gain experience by working on nuanced prob-
lems without any restraints is a socially useful activity. For instance, a 
situation where a law student volunteers for a government agency could 
be considered the pinnacle of a good unpaid internship. On the other 
side, internships that deceive students into performing menial tasks in 
the hope of eventually working on more important items are socially 
wasteful. Many stories of unpaid internships that pushed the plight of 
unpaid interns to the forefront of employment law contained similar el-
ements. As is often the case in law, the real difficulty lies in the middle 
between these two extremes. 
Additionally, some unpaid internships prevent or delay a person 
from using her skills at the highest value, which can harm economic 
efficiency. This economic harm has a dual nature: the harm caused by 
depriving the economy of the unpaid intern’s skills and the harm caused 
to another person that could better perform the unpaid intern’s job. For 
example, say a film student works on a movie set as an unpaid intern 
and mainly runs errands for the director and staff that may or may not 
be related to the production of the film. Presumably, the film student 
has above average skills at making movies (because she is a film stu-
dent) that are not being used in her current role. It would be more eco-
nomically efficient for that film student to do what she is best at than 
to run errands for the film crew. The film student is simply much better 
at working on a film production than doing errands. On the other hand, 
someone in the economy is likely better at running errands than the 
film student. In her current role, the film student is both depriving the 
economy of her unique skills, which society values more than running 
errands, and preventing someone else that is more efficient in the role 
from using his skills. In turn, that person’s skills are not contributing 
to the economy as a whole, likely occupying a spot that he is less effi-
cient at than running errands. When interns occupy roles that deprive 
them of the opportunity to use their most highly valued skills, society 
suffers as a result. 
Consequently, the most logical way to think about what causes 
harm in unpaid internships is through information asymmetry. In the 
previous example, the film student chooses to work as an unpaid intern 
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in the hope that the role will eventually result in employment. Unfor-
tunately for that intern, she does not know what the probability is that 
she will be offered employment eventually. In contrast, the employer 
likely knows with some certainty what the probability is that the intern 
will eventually be offered employment. It seems fair to say that the un-
paid intern would not work in that role if she knew that the chances of 
employment were zero percent. In fact, some risk-averse unpaid interns 
might avoid any role that did not have greater than a seventy-five per-
cent chance of manifesting in employment. In a different take, interns 
that increase their chances of employment in a similar role with a dif-
ferent employer may still overvalue the worth of an unpaid internship. 
Unfortunately, persons considering an unpaid internship cannot esti-
mate the odds of eventual employment with any certainty. If the infor-
mation asymmetry were decreased, those considering unpaid intern-
ships could make decisions that align with their risk tolerance. In order 
to rectify the problem of unpaid internships, the information asym-
metry that exists between employers and potential unpaid interns must 
be removed or lessened. 
II. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT 
CLASSIFICATION 
Unlike the United States, which only has three employment cate-
gories (employee, independent contractor, and volunteer), the United 
Kingdom has four statutorily defined categories: employee, worker, self-
employed or contractor, and voluntary worker.72 An “employee,” as de-
fined by the Employment Rights Act of 1996, 73 is “an individual who 
has entered into or works under . . . a contract of employment.”74 A con-
tract of employment can be written or oral and can also be express or 
implied.75 On the other hand, a “worker” is defined as: 
[A]n individual who has entered into or works under . . . 
(a) a contract of employment, or 
(b) any other contract, whether express or implied and . . . 
whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes 
 
 72 See Katie Clark & Paul McGrath, Employment and Employee Benefits in UK (England and 
Wales): Overview, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY UK LLP (Jan. 1, 2017), https://uk.practicallaw. 
thomsonreuters.com/7-503-4973?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=t 
rue&bhcp=1 (last visited Aug. 31, 2017). 
 73 Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, § 230 (Gr. Brit.). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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to do or perform personally any work or services for another 
party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract 
that of a client or customer of any profession or business under-
taking carried on by the individual.76 
In addition to “worker” and “employee,” the United Kingdom also de-
fines “voluntary worker.”77 The statutory definition of who qualifies as 
a “voluntary worker” is quite narrow, but “voluntary workers” are ex-
empt from minimum wage requirements.78 First, the worker must be 
employed “by a charity, a voluntary organisation, an associated fund-
raising body or a statutory body.”79 Second, the worker must not receive 
any compensation for his services except for expenses “actually incurred 
in the performance of his duties.”80 Finally, the worker may not receive 
any “benefits in kind of any description, or . . . benefits in kind other 
than the provision of some or all of his subsistence or of such accommo-
dation as is reasonable in the circumstances of the employment.”81 At 
first glance, it seems that the categories provided by the United King-
dom’s laws are superior to the vague definitions of “employee” provided 
by the FLSA in the United States. However, the lines between each em-
ployment category are equally chaotic within the courts. 
A. “Employee” vs. “Worker” 
In the United Kingdom, employment law differentiates between 
“employee” and “worker” on statutory definitions and common law 
tests. The statutory distinction is fairly thin, as an “employee” is en-
gaged under an employment contract, but a “worker” is engaged under 
a contract to render services.82 Even this line is muddled though, and 
the easiest way to interpret the distinction is to think of a “worker” as 
a casual worker that does not have to accept work and an “employee” 
as full-time laborer that does not have a choice.83 This further distin-
guishes a “worker” from an independent contractor, as “[t]he intention 
behind the regulation is plainly to create an intermediate class of pro-
tected worker, who is on the one hand not an employee but on the other 
 
 76 Id. 
 77 National Minimum Wage Act 1998, c. 39, § 44 (Gr. Brit.). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Employment Rights Act 1996, c.18, § 230 (Gr. Brit.). 
 83 See, e.g., Drake v. Ipsos Mori UK Ltd. [2012] EAT 2012 WL 2922990 (Eng.). 
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hand cannot . . . be regarded as [an independent contractor].”84 Concep-
tually, this allows a clear picture of what the different statutory provi-
sions imply. Of course, such a clear distinction can exist in the abstract 
but not hold constant in reality. 
Workers receive fewer employment rights than employees overall. 
For instance, workers are entitled to the national minimum wage,85 pro-
tection against unlawful deductions from wages, protection against un-
lawful discrimination, and protection for reporting wrongdoing in the 
workplace.86 However, workers are not entitled to minimum notice pe-
riods if employment is ending, protection against unfair dismissal, and 
time off for emergencies.87 The addition of a fourth employment cate-
gory allows the United Kingdom to mix and match which employment 
protections that different workers receive. In relation to internships, 
the addition of this fourth category allows the United Kingdom to pro-
tect interns with certain employment rights. 
At common law, the starting point to determine whether or not an 
employment relationship exists is to look for the existence of a contract. 
If there is a contract, three main factors distinguish whether or not it is 
a “contract of employment.” First, an employee must be under an obli-
gation to perform the work personally.88 Second, there must be mutual-
ity of obligation between the parties involved.89 Third, the employer 
must have a sufficient right of control over the employee.90 
In the past, courts in the United Kingdom have found that a con-
tract exists unless there is strong evidence of employment as a third 
party for a limited duration. For instance, in Hewlett Packard Ltd. v. 
O’Murphy,91 the court determined that an implied contract did not ma-
terialize purely because the worker was with a company longer than 
the original contract stated. Because the contract with the employment 
agency stated that the work was for a limited duration in a non-employ-
ment capacity, the court chose to find no contract of employment.92 In 
 
 84 Bryne Brothers (Formwork) Ltd. v. Baird, [2002] I.C.R. 667 (Eng.). 
 85 See National Minimum Wage Act 1998, c. 39, § 1 (Gr. Brit.) (guaranteeing the national 
minimum wage to “an individual who . . . is a worker . . . [or] is working . . . in the United Kingdom 
under his contract”). 
 86 Employment Status: Employee, GOV’T OF THE U.K. (2016), https://www.gov.uk/employment-
status/employee [https://perma.cc/ZXX5-MJM3]. 
 87 Employment Status: Worker, GOV’T OF THE U.K. (2016), https://www.gov.uk/employment-
status/worker [https://perma.cc/8UDW-RL67]. 
 88 See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
 89 See infra notes 100–104 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 91 [2001] EAT 2001 WL 1135163 (Eng.). 
 92 Id. at [21]. 
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contrast, in Franks v. Reuters Ltd.,93 the court determined that a worker 
who had worked for several years had developed an implied contract 
because of explicit interactions with her employer. The presiding judge 
stated that “a person cannot become an employee simply by reason of 
the length of time for which he does work for the same person. . . . [How-
ever], it is not irrelevant evidence in the context of an individual who 
sought a temporary placement.”94 Overall, courts are likely to find that 
a contract exists with relationships of a significant duration. 
After finding the existence of a contract, courts look to whether the 
employee must carry out the work personally. If the contract states that 
the work must be done personally, then that factor weighs in favor of 
finding the contract to be a contract of employment. In Express & Echo 
Publications Ltd. v. Tanton,95 the court held that a contract, which al-
lowed a person other than the worker to provide services, was not an 
employment contract. However, employers cannot avoid classifying 
their workers as employees simply by always including a clause in a 
contract that allows delegation. For example, in Autoclenz Ltd. v. 
Belcher,96 the U.K. Supreme Court found that a contract allowing valet 
drivers to contract out their work to other drivers did not stop that con-
tract from qualifying as a contract of employment. The Court discussed 
that the spirit of the contract “was that the claimants would show up 
each day to do work and that the respondent would offer work provided 
that it was there for them to do.”97 Furthermore, courts in the United 
Kingdom do not consider all circumstances where subcontracting is 
available to instantly disqualify the worker as an employee.98 In this 
circumstance, allowing a worker to draw from a pool of replacements in 
case of illness or absence does not prevent classification as an em-
ployee.99 Overall, it appears that courts in the United Kingdom consider 
a contract to be a contract of employment if the heart of the contract 
mandates personal service. 
Next, courts in the United Kingdom determine a contract to be a 
contract of employment if the contract contains mutuality of obligation. 
Under U.K. law, mutuality of obligation entails that employers must 
provide employees work and that employees must perform the work 
 
 93 [2003] EWCA (Civ) 417 (Eng.). 
 94 Id. 
 95 [1999] AC (Civ) ICR 693 (Eng.). 
 96 [2011] UKSC 41 (Eng.). 
 97 Id. at [37]. 
 98 MacFarlane v. Glasgow City Council [2000] EAT 2000 WL 699290 (Eng.). 
 99 Id. at [11]. 
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when it is offered.100 Requiring mutuality of obligation prevents casual 
workers from gaining status as employees. In the past, courts in the 
United Kingdom have refused to read in clauses defining mutuality of 
obligation into contracts that explicitly deny such a relationship.101 Ad-
ditionally, courts have also refused to imply a clause in contracts that 
states mutuality of obligation where the arrangement between the par-
ties was casual.102 Nevertheless, status as a casual worker does not nec-
essarily prevent classification as an employee. The court in Drake v. 
Ipsos Mori UK Ltd.103 found that once an employer gave a work assign-
ment to a casual worker, then the casual worker was obligated to carry 
out the work personally for payment. It is unclear whether this case is 
distinguishable from past contemplations of what is required for mutu-
ality of obligation. Temporary agency workers also face difficulty estab-
lishing employee status because of the nature of their arrangement 
with the employer. Courts in the United Kingdom reject the idea that a 
temporary agency worker is necessarily guaranteed work during the 
limited period he is employed.104 Outside of a few minor exceptions, 
courts in the United Kingdom consider mutuality of obligation to exist 
only if specifically provided for in the contract. 
Finally, courts in the United Kingdom require an employer to have 
control over the work that its employee does. If the employer retains an 
overarching right of control throughout the relationship, then the 
worker is considered an employee.105 It is incorrect to treat “the absence 
of actual day-to-day control as the determinative factor rather than ad-
dressing the cumulative effect of the totality of the provisions in the 
[contract] and all the circumstances of the relationship created by it.”106 
Requiring an overarching right of control throughout the employment 
relationship also makes it difficult for temporary workers to establish 
employee status. Even temporary workers who eventually become per-
manent employees have difficulty establishing the required level of con-
trol.107 Generally, however, if the employment relationship is not set for 
a limited time and delegated by an agency contract, then an overarching 
right of control is likely to be found. 
 
 100 See Drake v. Ipsos Mori UK Ltd. [2012] EAT 2012 WL 2922990 (Eng.). 
 101 Stevedoring & Haulage Services Ltd. v. Fuller [2001] EWCA (Civ) 651 [2001] IRLR 627 at 
628 (Eng.). 
 102 Carmichael v. National Power Plc. [1999] ICR 1226 (HL) (Eng.). 
 103 [2012] EAT 2012 WL 2922990 (Eng.). 
 104 Stephenson v. Delphi Diesel Ltd. [2002] EAT 2002 WL 31962063 (Eng.). 
 105 See White v. Troutbeck SA [2013] EWCA (Civ) 1171 (EAT) (Eng.). 
 106 Id. at [38]. 
 107 Dacas v. Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd. [2004] EWCA (Civ) 217 (AC) (Eng.). 
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Analyzing the common law tests that divide a “worker” from an 
“employee” is crucial to understanding U.K. law on interns. Consider 
an intern that is employed for a limited period of time through her post-
secondary institution’s program that matches students with intern-
ships. This intern would have very little chance of establishing herself 
as an employee because of her status as a temporary agency worker. It 
is unclear whether the company hiring the intern would have to provide 
work on a regular basis for the intern. If the company explicitly stated 
in the contract that no mutuality of obligation existed, it is extremely 
unlikely that the intern could be classified as an employee. While clas-
sification as a worker is more protective than classification as a volun-
tary worker, the intern would still lack certain protections, including 
parental leave and protection from unlawful dismissal.108 
B. Voluntary Worker vs. Worker 
Distinct from a volunteer, a “voluntary worker” is best understood 
as a “worker” that labors in the “voluntary sector,”109 and unlike a 
“worker” or an “employee,” “voluntary workers” are defined specifically 
within statute. First, a worker can only be classified as a “voluntary 
worker” if that worker is employed “by a charity, a voluntary organiza-
tion, an associated fund-raising body or a statutory body.”110 Second, a 
“voluntary worker” cannot receive compensation outside of reimburse-
ment for actual expenses incurred.111 It is not possible to avoid this rule 
by providing benefits in kind in place of compensation.112 An exception 
is made for some compensation though, as a worker can receive com-
pensation “solely for the purpose of providing him with means of sub-
sistence.”113 Additionally, “any training (other than that which a person 
necessarily acquires in the course of doing his work) shall be taken to 
be a benefit in kind.”114 However, “training provided for the sole or main 
purpose of improving the worker’s ability to perform the work which he 
has agreed to do” is not considered to be a benefit in kind.115 
 
 108 Employment Rights and Pay for Interns, GOV’T OF THE U.K. (2016), https://www.gov.uk/em 
ployment-rights-for-interns [https://perma.cc/S5Y3-BW34]. 
 109 See Best v. St. Austell China Clay Museum Ltd. [2004] EAT 2004 WL 1640208 (Eng.). 
 110 National Minimum Wage Act 1998, c. 39, § 44. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
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In the past, courts in the United Kingdom have rejected concrete 
legal rules in favor of common sense factual determinations with volun-
tary workers. For instance, in Migrant Advisory Service v. Chaudri,116 
the court ruled that a voluntary worker who was compensated for rea-
sonable expenses did not qualify as a voluntary worker because the 
compensation was too excessive. Ms. Chaudri was paid £25 per week in 
compensation for “voluntary expenses” in need of reimbursement, 
which is allowed for voluntary workers.117 Ms. Chaudri worked for 
twelve hours every week and walked to the office where she volun-
teered.118 After a few years on the job, Ms. Chaudri began receiving £40 
per week.119 Despite the parties’ attempts to claim that this reimburse-
ment was suited to “voluntary expenses,” the court disagreed, stating 
that “this is a very simple case and it is perhaps, in a way, like the 
elephant—you know one when you see one.”120 Similarly, the court in 
Armitage v. Relate121 found that a voluntary worker qualified as an em-
ployee because of the obvious exchange of work for training, require-
ment to work at scheduled times, and eventual incorporation as an em-
ployee upon completion of all requirements.122 Like the court in 
Chaudri, the court remarked that “this case is such that allowing the 
workers to masquerade as voluntary workers is nothing but a poor at-
tempt to circumnavigate the clearest of statutory distinctions.”123 
If a voluntary worker is held to a certain set of obligations related 
to performance of work, courts in the United Kingdom have generally 
found an employment relationship to exist. In an effort to capture the 
essence of the relationship, U.K. courts do not limit definition to strict 
contractual terms. In the United Kingdom, most voluntary workers sign 
“volunteer agreements” that state the terms under which a person can 
volunteer.124 Many volunteer agreements straddle the line between 
valid agreements and hidden contracts of employment. For instance, in 
Murray v. Newham Citizens Advice Bureau,125 the court determined 
that a volunteer agreement—which included time commitments of a 
minimum time period, time period requirements to complete basic 
 
 116 [1998] EAT 1400/97; 1998 LEXIS 5254 (Eng.). 
 117 Id. at *2; see National Minimum Wage Act 1998, c. 39, § 44. 
 118 Chaudri, 1998 LEXIS 5254 at *1–*2. 
 119 Id. at *2. 
 120 Id. at *3. 
 121 [1994] IT 43438/94 (ET) (Eng.). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See, e.g., Murray v. Newham Citizens Advice Bureau [2001] EAT 1096/99 [2001] ICR 708 
(Eng.). 
 125 [2001] EAT 1096/99 [2001] ICR 708 (Eng.). 
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training, grievance and disciplinary processes, expense requirements, 
and commitments related to claiming holidays—amounted to an em-
ployment contract. Unlike Relate or Chaudri, the court did not point to 
a single issue as key to finding the existence of an employment contract. 
Instead, the court stated that “[i]t is simply not right to say that under 
the agreement there is no obligation on either party. On the contrary 
the document sets out for each party to the agreement a series of sepa-
rate obligations and commitments.”126 Of course, the court also notes 
that the mere presence of obligations in a contract does not necessarily 
imply whether the contract is for the performance of services or for em-
ployment.127 In addition to common sense evaluations of factual situa-
tions, courts in the United Kingdom have adopted a holistic approach 
to determine whether or not an implied contract exists between an or-
ganization and a voluntary worker. 
Courts in the United Kingdom also consider voluntary workers to 
be subject to an employment contract if the employer has any legal rem-
edy against the voluntary workers for failure to perform work. In South 
East Sheffield Citizens Advice Bureau v. Grayson128 the court stated 
that the critical question in cases concerning volunteer agreements is 
“whether the volunteers were contractually obliged to provide their ser-
vices.”129 In this particular case, the court found that the volunteer 
agreement was a list of expectations, rather than a contract of obliga-
tions. According to the court, “someone who is indisputably engaged un-
der a contract of service, or for services, will not usually find his and his 
employer’s respective contractual obligations expressed in terms of ‘rea-
sonable expectations.’”130 Furthermore, the court determined that the 
presence of a contractual relationship with regard to reimbursement 
did not result in a contract of employment.131 The court distinguishes 
this situation by acknowledging that voluntary workers can be bound 
by contracts, just not contracts that create obligations to perform ser-
vices. In recent years, courts in the United Kingdom have continued to 
embrace the reasoning that a contract of obligations is the only true 
determinative factor between a voluntary worker and an employment 
relationship.132 
 
 126 Id. at [9]. 
 127 Id. at [14]. 
 128 [2003] EAT 0283/03 [2004] ICR 1138 (Eng.). 
 129 Id. at [13]. 
 130 Id. at [15]. 
 131 Id. at [20]. 
 132 See X v. Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau [2011] EWCA (Civ) 28 [2011] ICR 460 (Eng.). 
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C. Interns as Volunteers 
An intern in the United Kingdom may be classified by any of the 
three terms previously discussed. However, an intern may also operate 
as a volunteer. Under U.K. law, a “voluntary worker” is statutorily de-
fined and is not synonymous with a volunteer; there is no statutory def-
inition for a volunteer.133 In this way, U.K. law is fairly similar to the 
United States, but the presence of three employment categories and 
strict conditions on implied contracts of obligation help to curtail the 
amount of interns who work as volunteers. Nevertheless, there are cir-
cumstances in which interns, acting as volunteers, have successfully 
demonstrated the existence of an implied contract to perform services 
or an implied contract of employment. In order to determine whether 
an intern is actually an “employee” or “worker,” courts consider similar 
factors to whether or not a worker is a “voluntary worker.” 
In the past, courts in the United Kingdom have found that an in-
tern should be considered an employee when mutual obligations are 
present. For instance, in Vetta v. London Dreams Motion Pictures 
Ltd.,134 an employment tribunal found that an assistant for an art de-
partment who was paid on an expenses-only basis was an employee be-
cause of mutual obligations within an intern agreement. In the agree-
ment, the intern was required to log her hours, keep a regular schedule, 
and perform certain tasks in exchange for continued work.135 The court 
found little evidence that the intern was purely a volunteer and stated 
that “[t]here is no doubt that the Claimant was a worker within . . . the 
definition of worker both in the National Minimum Wage and Working 
Time Regulations legislation.”136 The mutuality of obligation laid out in 
the agreement created an implied contract of employment or at the very 
least an implied contract to perform services.137 
Furthermore, courts in the United Kingdom have considered in-
terns to be more than volunteers when they are required to keep certain 
hours as a condition of employment. In Hudson v. TPG Web Publishing 
Ltd.,138 an employment tribunal determined that an intern who was 
told by her supervisor to work between the hours of 10 a.m. and 6 p.m. 
 
 133 Doug Pyper, The National Minimum Wage: Volunteers and Interns 6, HOUSE OF COMMONS 
(Dec. 21, 2015), http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN00697/SN00697.pdf. 
 134 [2008] ET 2703377/08 (Eng.). 
 135 Id. at [10]. 
 136 Id. at [14]. 
 137 Id. 
 138 [2011] ET 2200565/11 (Eng.). For a summary of the case in the press, see Shiv Malik, Un-
paid Website Intern Celebrates Court Victory, GUARDIAN (May 23, 2011), https://www.theguard 
ian.com/media/2011/may/23/unpaid-website-intern-court-victory [https://perma.cc/T4VD-GXDX]. 
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was an employee because an implied contract was formed that entailed 
obligations. Although there was no written contract of employment be-
tween the employer and the intern, the court determined that an im-
plied obligation to be present during certain hours was sufficient to find 
a relationship greater than that of a volunteer.139 In this case, the court 
also determined that informal discussions between the intern and her 
supervisor about the potential of pay in the future were sufficient con-
sideration in exchange for working certain hours.140 The court also 
noted that any requirement related to hours for interns would provide 
some evidence of an employment relationship.141 
Overall, the United Kingdom provides a solid foundation for pro-
tecting against abusive unpaid internships. Part of this foundation is a 
result of the expansive employment categories previously defined in 
this Comment. However, an even larger level of protection comes from 
the judicial reasoning employed by judges in the United Kingdom re-
garding the existence of an employment contract or a contract to render 
services. In many cases regarding the fine line between an “employee” 
and an intern, the difference comes from the existence of an agreement 
that is not tangible but still effective. This reasoning mirrors many of 
the complaints given by unpaid interns regarding their volunteer status 
under the law: even if there is no contract binding their actions, many 
volunteers feel that there are unspoken obligations that they must fol-
low for risk of losing the opportunity. Such a keen judicial awareness 
on the particular subject of internships helps provide a strong backing 
for interns in the United Kingdom. 
III. THE EFFICACY OF U.K. LAW AND BENEFIT TO THE UNITED STATES 
The purpose of analyzing the laws and common law precedent of 
the United Kingdom is to provide some understanding of two employ-
ment systems that seem similar but are actually fairly different. Includ-
ing a fourth employment category greatly expands which workers are 
given certain protections under U.K. law. A substantial number of U.S. 
interns would likely be considered “workers” in the United Kingdom. Of 
course, the central question is how these different laws actually impact 
internship levels in the United Kingdom compared to the United States. 
Furthermore, much of the discussion of the two different employment 
systems seems to note some tension between the following questions: 
which nation’s employment law is best for interns and which nation’s 
 
 139 Hudson, ET 2200565/11. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
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employment law is best for all members of the labor force. However, it 
does not seem that such considerations are opposed based on the exten-
sive case law in both nations covering the topic; in fact, this Comment 
argues that the answers to those two questions are one and the same. 
To solve this issue, the United States should adopt contractual stand-
ards from the United Kingdom to cure information asymmetry between 
employers and interns. 
A. Unpaid Internship Levels in the United Kingdom and the United 
States 
Overall, levels of unpaid internships are lower in the United King-
dom than in the United States. For both nations, data is not extensive 
on the actual number of unpaid interns at any given time. However, the 
figures that do exist are illustrative of the broader point that there are 
significantly fewer unpaid internships in the United Kingdom than in 
the United States. As of 2015, only twenty-one thousand university 
graduates and students in the United Kingdom reported that they had 
participated in an unpaid internship in the past year.142 Generally, the 
U.K. labor force total hovers around thirty-two million people at 
work.143 Thus, only one in every 1,523 workers in the United Kingdom 
worked in an unpaid internship during 2015. For comparison, in 2012 
through 2014, between five hundred thousand and one million workers 
in the United State reported participating in an unpaid internship in 
the past year.144 About 152 million Americans participated in the labor 
force overall during these years.145 In the United States between 2012 
and 2014, one in every 304 workers participated in an unpaid intern-
ship at minimum, with numbers potentially as high as one in every 152 
workers participating in an unpaid internship. From a numerical 
standpoint, it seems that employment laws in the United Kingdom may 
prevent high levels of unpaid internships. 
Several clarifications must be made to this numerical data, how-
ever. One argument may be that the United States as a whole has a 
 
 142 Federica Cocco, There Are 21,000 Unpaid Workers in the UK—They’re Interns, MIRROR 
(Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/ampp3d/21000-unpaid-workers-uk—-4984262 [htt 
ps://perma.cc/8MKY-6KJF]. 
 143 UK Labour Market: February 2016, UK OFFICE OF NAT’L STAT. (2016), https://www.ons.gov. 
uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabou 
rmarket/february2016 [https://perma.cc/DK3T-QHUC]. 
 144 Blair Hickman, What We Learned Investigating Unpaid Internships, PROPUBLICA (July 23, 
2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/what-we-learned-investigating-unpaid-internships [htt 
ps://perma.cc/62AL-W2HK]. 
 145 Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. 
(Jan. 3, 2017), https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS11300000 [https://perma.cc/V2L6-F9TH]. 
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substantially larger media sector than the United Kingdom. Media 
companies are among the most notorious offenders in creating and us-
ing abusive unpaid internships.146 In fact, seventeen of the world’s larg-
est media companies are based in the United States, posting a combined 
$200.23 billion in media revenue during 2016.147 However, it is likely 
that if these companies were located in the United Kingdom and at-
tempted to hire unpaid interns in a similar manner to those in the 
United States, courts would find that the interns would qualify as “em-
ployees” or “workers.” In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.148 a 
court in the United Kingdom would have considered the mutuality of 
obligation present from the employment relationship as an implied con-
tract of employment, based on a similar rationale to that used in intern 
cases in the United Kingdom.149 Another argument about the inade-
quacy of this data may focus on the extent of unreported unpaid intern-
ships that occur through the exception of job shadowing.150 Some re-
ports suggest that there are many more unpaid internships in the 
United Kingdom than reported.151 There is little evidence that the prac-
tice of job shadowing occurs to any great extent though. Even organiza-
tions that campaign to end all unpaid internships do not consider the 
loophole to be a significant cause of unreported unpaid internships.152 
B. Potential Legislative and Judicial Solutions in the United States 
This Comment recommends that the United States take action 
both legislatively and judicially to fix current flaws in employment law 
that proliferate abusive unpaid internships. Furthermore, this Com-
ment looks exclusively to the current laws and precedent of the United 
Kingdom to inform decisions that can be made by the U.S. government 
and courts of the United States in particular. 
 
 146 See, e.g., Neil Howe, The Unhappy Rise of the Millennial Intern, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/04/22/the-unhappy-rise-of-the-millennial-intern/#179c 
eaae5b73 [https://perma.cc/R3C8-VYPW]. 
 147 Lara O’Reilly, The 30 Biggest Media Companies in the World, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 31, 
2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-30-biggest-media-owners-in-the-world-2016-5/#30-tim 
e-inc—287-billion-in-media-revenue-1 [https://perma.cc/3ZBC-AVFY]. 
 148 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 149 See Hudson v. TPG Web Publishing Ltd., [2011] ET 2200565/11 (Eng.). 
 150 See Employment Rights and Pay for Interns, GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/employment-rights-for-interns [https://perma.cc/78EQ-4284]. 
 151 See, e.g., THE SUTTON TRUST, RESEARCH BRIEF: INTERNSHIP OF INDENTURE? 1 (Nov. 2014), 
http://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Unpaid-Internships.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/YZB8-4SPL]. 
 152 See, e.g., What Does the Law Say About Unpaid Internships?, INTERN AWARE, http://www.in 
ternaware.org/understand_the_law [https://perma.cc/Y5X4-2JGC] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
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First, Congress should introduce legislation that would define a 
new employment category of “intern.” An intern would be defined as 
any worker that participates in employment for a fixed duration of time 
with the primary goal of gaining experience. The law would look to the 
tests established by the United Kingdom to determine whether a con-
tract of employment exists. A crucial component of this categorization 
would be the recognition of implied contracts created between employ-
ers and interns that create mutual obligations even if not specified in a 
contractual arrangement. Leaving recognition of implied contractual 
relations to the judiciary is perfectly normal within the typical under-
standing of laws created by the legislature. Furthermore, the law would 
specifically state the considerations and determinative factors that 
should be present in an employment relationship, including mutuality 
of obligations. Alternatively, the United States could adopt a system 
similar to the United Kingdom’s by creating a category like “worker.” 
Judges may not want to consider unpaid interns employees in the 
United States because of the substantial acquisition of protection that 
such a designation brings. Additionally, the government may think that 
interns should have the ability to bring discrimination claims like em-
ployees currently can, while also wanting to avoid mandating that all 
interns receive the minimum wage. Creating an employment category 
between the two extremes of no protection and full protection might en-
able judges to view the claims of unpaid interns more favorably. How-
ever, this Comment recognizes that legislative change in the United 
States can be slow at times and such a massive change to the entire 
American employment structure may be too much to ask in a short pe-
riod of time. 
Second, judges in the United States should embrace the judicial 
reasoning used by courts in the United Kingdom to determine whether 
an intern qualifies as an employee. Although some U.S. courts in the 
past have shown a willingness to consider a mutual beneficiary test, 
courts instead should look to mutuality of obligations described in im-
plied contracts or agreements that typically do not hold contractual 
weight. Such an interpretation is perfectly in line with the FLSA defi-
nitions of “employee” and “employ.” After all, the current definition of 
“to suffer or permit work” is so truly vague that considering employ-
ment as mutual obligations does not seem too far-fetched.153 Modifying 
judicial reasoning to comport with a different understanding of employ-
ment relationships would help judges to narrow down cases that con-
tain instances of abuse. Furthermore, it would allow courts the latitude 
to consider all aspects of a factual situation in a way that is less obtuse 
 
 153 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). 
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than the presence of yet another multi-factor test. Of course, this Com-
ment recognizes that such a simplistic, holistic approach could likely 
fade into confusion after some time because of the myriad forms of ju-
dicial reasoning that would result. However, even though this new ap-
proach could become clouded, it would still be clearer than the status 
quo. 
In essence, the two proposed solutions work in tandem to reduce 
information asymmetry. If the judiciary embraces the mutuality of ob-
ligation test combined with the presence of implied contracts, two situ-
ations will emerge. First, employers will explicitly disclaim the possi-
bility of full-time employment for unpaid interns in some sort of 
contractual agreement. This first safeguard will force companies to 
place in writing that employment will likely not follow an unpaid in-
ternship. For some potential interns, this statement will be sufficient to 
narrow the information asymmetry to an appropriate level. Some may 
still choose to participate in the internship, but they will be aware that 
the work they perform does not obligate the employer to later hire them. 
Second, employers who explicitly disclaim in writing but dangle the op-
portunity of employment through actions or statements will be subject 
to the finding of an implied contract of employment because of the mu-
tual obligations present. Both situations will force companies to hon-
estly assess and disclose whether the unpaid internships could lead to 
employment, reducing the information asymmetry that causes unpaid 
internships to be socially wasteful. 
However, the two solutions that would improve the law of unpaid 
internships cannot work separately. If Congress defines a new employ-
ment category of “intern” and assigns that category the proper protec-
tions, but the judiciary refuses to accept a new approach to separating 
employment from internship, the new categorization will be for naught. 
It might be the case that some judges would be more likely to assign 
internship status in some questionable cases without the mutuality of 
obligation test, but many cases would still exist in the common law 
limbo of past precedent. Similarly, if the judiciary adopts a mutuality 
of obligation test with the presence of implied contracts, but Congress 
refuses to change existing law, employers could react by scrapping most 
intern positions all together. The sharp slope between a worker that is 
not protected by any law and an employee that is protected by all em-
ployment law might be too substantial of a risk for any company to face. 
If the solutions do not operate together, there is a risk that the current 
situation will simply continue in a different form or that opportunities 
for students will be severely limited. Nevertheless, if both solutions 
work together, the underlying issue that causes unpaid internships to 
29 SOULE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/17  9:06 PM 
767] LEARNING THROUGH EXPERIENCE 795 
 
be socially wasteful will be mitigated, while still providing students 
plenty of opportunities. 
CONCLUSION 
The laws surrounding unpaid internships in the United States are 
a confusing mess of precedent and government suggestions that hold 
little coherence. Although employment law in the United Kingdom is 
far from perfect, the classifications given by U.K. law are a useful ap-
proach to better define employment categories and the protections that 
the law should give each distinct group. Unpaid interns, as a whole, can 
be a fairly distinct group that would benefit substantially from certain 
legal protections, like the right to bring discrimination actions. More 
importantly, borrowing the laws and legal reasoning of the United 
Kingdom would allow the United States to define which protections are 
important for interns. The current system that creates a stark choice 
between full legal protection and no legal protection is unclear, and it 
certainly cannot stand on the grounds of efficacy. 
 
